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ABSTRACT
This article argues that aspects of the animal rights view can be con-
structively modulated through a communitarian approach and come 
to promote animal welfare through the social contexts of expanded 
caring communities. The Nordic welfare state is presented as a con-
ceivable caring community within which animals could be viewed 
and treated appropriately as co-citizens with solidarity based rights 
and duties. 
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On the Notion of Moral Rights
Unlike legal rights, moral rights (or natural rights) are not 
dependent on any political laws or societal norms. They are 
universal and considered unacquired and inalienable in that 
they can only in extreme cases be forfeited by the right hold-
er or eliminated by others. This universality claim of natural 
rights necessitates a further and deeper grounding of authority. 
Traditionally, this has either been accomplished by reference 
to a deity, as when the American Declaration of Independence 
states that all men “are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights”, or by reference to the faculties of reason. 
Disallowing the former we are left with the theory that natu-
ral rights can be claimed through an argument from reason. 
This is the assertion in both classical liberalism (Locke 1988, 
271) and in the work of the modern libertarian Robert Nozick 
(1974). An inherent self-ownership is maintained which trans-
lates to a right to one’s own body and life – which then again 
generates further rights. Even if such an argumentative move 
is possible, it still leaves us with issues pertaining to the neces-
sarily relational aspects of rights. If one has a right, someone 
else must have a duty. This is a prerequisite for both self-own-
ership and the possession of rights. Ownership – of oneself or 
of things – makes no sense without others. By definition, an 
entirely isolated individual does not and cannot own anything, 
as owning logically implies not only that the object owned 
belongs to him, but that it does not belong to someone else. 
If there is no ”someone else” then the concept of ownership 
simply loses all meaning. Similarly, rights can only be under-
stood and be meaningful as long as there are others who, be-
cause of my rights, have duties of action or omission towards 
me. Even if one does not agree that rights necessitate duties it 
would be difficult to explain any prescriptive rights in the ab-
sence of anyone to prescribe them to. This inevitably removes 
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the universality, and, partially, the inherency from the notion 
of rights. If a situation exists, e.g. being isolated or having no 
relations, which precludes any meaningful notion of rights, 
then universality, which is an either-or type of concept, is un-
attainable. Indeed, any claim of a relation-free universal type 
of rights could appropriately be categorized as “… rhetorical 
nonsense – nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 1843, 501).
When addressing the question of rights for animals, Tom Re-
gan provides us with a neo-Kantian animal rights theory based 
on the human-like cognitive abilities of many different species 
of animals. His chief work, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), 
is, to a large extent, a response to and criticism of Peter Singer’s 
utilitarian animal ethics approach (Singer 1993). Throughout 
this and future books, Regan argues that individual rights, and 
not the reduction of suffering, should be the key element of 
moral evaluation. Regan clearly agrees with many of Singer’s 
semi-abolitionist answers on the question of animal use (ibid. 
64), but he disagrees with the fundamental premises of Singer’s 
argument and fears that the utilitarian theory does not fully 
protect animals from harmful human exploitation. Specifically, 
Regan claims that Singer’s utilitarianism could leave room for a 
justification of evil means in order to gain good ends. To avoid 
this problem, he has developed a theory based on the inher-
ent value of certain kinds of life forms and the basic (natural) 
rights attributed to the possession of such values. He dismisses 
Kant’s original argument, that only morally capable agents can 
have inherent value, as arbitrary (Regan 2004, 239), and ex-
pands the group of beings who have inherent value (or are ends 
in themselves) to include all those which are subject-of-a-life. 
To be such a subject involves the possession of a number of 
different cognitive capabilities such as belief, preferences, ex-
periential life, and a perception of time: “Those who satisfy the 
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subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of 
value – inherent value – and are not to be viewed or treated as 
mere receptacles” (ibid., 243). This distinctive kind of value 
is uniquely different from intrinsic values derived from the 
subjects evaluation of positive and negative experience (ibid., 
235). Inherent value is categorical and absolute and there are no 
degrees or levels of value involved. It is a matter of status: you 
either are a being with inherent value and thus equally valuable 
with all other subjects-of-a-life, or you are not. 
According to Regan the possession of inherent value trans-
lates into having fundamental rights. These are basic moral 
rights which are unacquired, universal, and equal between 
relevantly similar individuals and they consign duties of re-
spectful treatment to all ethical agents (ibid., 327). Applied to 
the world as we know it, this would halt all systematic uses 
of animals (at least mammals of one year or more) in which 
animals are not also treated as ends in themselves (ibid., 358). 
Regan acknowledges that specific situations can arise where, 
ceteris paribus, the rights of some ought to be overridden by 
the rights of others. Such extreme situations would be a choice 
between two unavoidable evils and one should always attempt 
to achieve the lesser of the two. Our organized uses of animals 
throughout different areas of society are, however, rarely clear 
examples of lesser and greater evils. Normal animal agricul-
ture is, arguably, a classic example of someone profiting from 
the violation of the rights of others, and entailing that subjects-
of-a-life are brought “to an untimely end because of human 
interests” (ibid., 394). 
To have a right is, according to Regan’s notion of the concept, 
to be in a position to claim (ibid., 271). Rights are, therefore, 
fundamentally present in subjects-of-a-life in an agency-free 
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context, while the claims themselves are only possible in rela-
tion to moral agents.  This appears to encounter the principle 
problem of how we could possibly conceive of rights meaning-
fully if the subject-of-a-life was the only being in the world – or 
if none of the other beings were ethical agents capable of the 
sort of relation that includes rights and duties. Furthermore, 
Regan’s notion of inherent value, upon which his claim of in-
herent rights rests, is detached from any actual evaluation.
“…, inherent value exists logically independently of 
valuers; that is, of individuals who recognize value. 
That is, for Regan, an individual having inherent value 
should be clearly distinguished from that individual 
being valued by others” (Rowlands 1998, 87).
Additionally, inherent value is independent from what Re-
gan calls intrinsic value, i.e. the value that a certain being it-
self attaches to its experiences (Regan 2004, 235-236). Thus a 
subject-of-a-life might by definition be such a being which can 
intrinsically value itself, but its valuing of itself is not the basis 
of its inherent value. This purposefully distinguishes the theo-
ry from a utilitarian view by rejecting the idea of individuals as 
preference-satisfaction receptacles (ibid. 210), but it also leaves 
us with another fundamental conundrum: how are we to under-
stand the concept of value without reference to anyone or any-
thing valuing? Rowlands calls this sort of logically indepen-
dent value “mysterious” (Rowlands 1998, 86), causing one to 
speculate upon the foundation or origin of inherent value, and 
whether, indeed, there is one. Lastly, it is not totally apparent 
what the connection might be and how the causality operates 
between animals being subjects-of-a-life (and thereby having 
inherent, indivisible value) and animals being holders of rights. 
This is probably best explained by combining two of Regan’s 
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underlying ethical assumptions: questions about morality are 
primarily questions about justice – “[p]aramount among our 
unacquired duties is the duty of justice” (Regan 2004, 274) – 
and, secondly, this view is a result of our considered moral be-
liefs (reflective intuitions) (ibid., 133-140). 
Regan’s considered beliefs are similar to the reflective equi-
librium of John Rawls (ibid., 135) who predominantly employs 
such as a method in the formation of principles of justice – a 
formation derived from an ongoing reflection over principles 
of justice, moral intuitions, and the “original position” (Rawls 
1988, 17-22). In spite of these similarities and the general mutu-
al emphasis upon rights, Regan and Rawls fundamentally dis-
agree on the possible extents of a rights view and the status of 
animals that this entails. Whereas Regan includes all moral pa-
tients (subjects-of-a-life) in his theory, Rawls’ more contractar-
ian based approach consciously excludes all non-moral persons 
– i.e. all beings who do not have “a conception of their good” 
and “are [not] capable of having […] a sense of justice” (ibid., 
505). Most significantly, the latter of these two carries with it a 
necessary exclusion of animals from the spheres of justice and 
rights. Without these capabilities, animals, and by default, hu-
man infants and the severely mentally disabled (Garner 2003, 
6-10), are incapable of entering the contractual situation requi-
site for having duties as well as rights. 
“…, it does seem that we are not required to give strict 
justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. […] 
They [animals] are outside the scope of the theory of 
justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the con-
tract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way” 
(Rawls 1988, 512)
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Peter Carruthers follows this part of Rawls’ reasoning, lead-
ing to the inevitable conclusion that animals do not have direct 
ethical standing (Carruthers 1992). This follows Kant’s origi-
nal argument on this subject (Kant 2001, 212), and asserts that 
any wrongness committed against an animal can only have 
ethical ramifications indirectly through, for example, the hu-
man owner of the animal. Thus, wantonly kicking a dog is not 
ethically problematic unless the dog has a master capable of 
entering the moral contract. Rawls, on the other hand, does not 
exclude animals from the sphere of ethics and states that it is 
certainly “wrong to be cruel to animals” and that their capaci-
ties for pain and pleasure “clearly impose duties of compassion 
and humanity” (Rawls 1988, 512). Although this could be seen 
as an inclusion, it still, specifically, removes animals from any 
political or legalistic deliberations or concern, thus, effectively, 
dividing the notion of morals into two aspects. The wrongness 
of animal cruelty and the duties of compassion can, in this 
light, only be construed as a kind of personal moral matter, 
detached and distinct from the moral matters of justice, human 
society and state.
A number of problems arise from the above mentioned 
rights, theories and their contractarian versions. One such 
prominent problem is the assumption that an ethical theory 
in general and a theory of distributive justice especially, must 
necessarily be grounded in the liberalistic rights of the individ-
ual. In the animal ethics of contemporary socialist thinker Ted 
Benton (1993), we are presented with a change of the underly-
ing premise. Although inspired by Marx’s idea of distribution 
“from each according to his ability to each according to his 
needs” (Marx 2008, 27), Benton dismisses the anthropocentric 
nature of Marx’s original work. He remains, however, focused 
on the basic concepts of need, species-being, and alienation, 
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and he criticizes the liberal rights view of its failing inclusivity 
and of failing to realize the institutionality of animal use and 
abuse. By referring to needs as the moral relevancy in a “so-
cialist principle of justice”, Benton steers clear of the Rawlsian 
split between animals being owed compassion but not rights, 
and can argue “that there is no ontological obstacle to its exten-
sion beyond species boundaries” (Benton 1993, 212). With re-
gard to institutionality, Benton argues that many animals, like 
an impoverished working class, are suffering not only because 
of the acts of individuals in society but, additionally, because 
of the activities of very complex societal systems. A liberal 
rights theory, he claims, addresses the notion of violation as 
a one-to-one scenario in which rights are held and violated 
by individuals (ibid., 89). This is, however, not the most com-
mon representation of our relation to animals. The extent to 
which responsibility for the violation of the rights of billions of 
animals, reared for food each year by the animal agricultural 
industry, can be assigned to an individual, is limited. The ques-
tion of whether to reproach farmers, the business executives, 
the investors, the retailers, the consumers, the legislators, or 
“a civil service which fails to enforce what legislation there is” 
(ibid., 89-90), becomes, rather, a question about systems and 
institutions, not about whose rights impose whose duties.
The Welfare State and Inclusive Communitarian-
ism
The social democracy of the Nordic welfare state is based 
on a number of key ideas with an emphasis on equality and 
solidarity. The notion of equality in the welfare state stresses, 
also, the importance of the equality of results as opposed to 
purely the equality of opportunity, thereby setting it apart from 
more market oriented and liberalistic states. This kind of out-
come equality (or benefit equality) not only focuses on equal 
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points of origin, but endeavors to include different stages of 
life and the needs associated with these stages. Furthermore, it 
universalizes not only the levels of distribution but the defini-
tion of citizenship, including everybody who needs it and not 
just those who contribute through their work (Knudsen 1995, 
5). This connects to another significant feature of the Nordic 
welfare state: fellowship or, as it is known in the context of 
social democratic thought, solidarity: “… a universal welfare 
state may be seen as an experiment in solidaristic behavior 
on a massive scale” (Kuhnle and Hort 2004, 17). Drawing on 
centuries-old collectivist traditions, solidarity in Scandinavian 
political thought includes “a sense of belonging to and identify-
ing with others” (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 158), and the readi-
ness to accept one’s share of both responsibility and destiny in 
the common future of the society. There is a strong element of 
reciprocity in this concept of solidarity (ibid., 159), combin-
ing the importance of obligation of the community/state to take 
care of the individual with the requirement of the individual 
to contribute to the community/state. But, provided that need 
is the factor which decides the manner of help the citizen re-
ceives from the state (Knudsen 1995, 5), solidarity is limitedly 
reciprocal insofar as it demands social contribution only from 
those who are capable. No incapability – prolonged or tempo-
rary, complete or partial – is enough to disqualify the citizen 
from the right to the common resources and care.
The structure and the underlying fundamental political val-
ues of the Nordic welfare state are indicative of a certain kind 
of social connectedness. This is, on a number of levels, com-
parable to the communitarianism of political philosophy with 
its emphasis on humans as social beings whose active happi-
ness can only be achieved through the community. Originating 
from Aristotelian virtue ethics and political theory, the com-
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munitarian state is not to be understood as a neutral guard-
ian of the individual citizen’s autonomy, but as an entity with 
the explicit purpose of assuring the common best. This idea is 
founded on a methodological and a normative understanding 
of humans and society. Methodologically, communitarianism 
criticizes liberalism for a misinterpretation of the world by not 
recognizing “the fact that the self is ‘embedded’ or ‘situated’ 
in existing social practices” (Kymlicka 2002, 221), and never 
exists in a pre-social condition. From this embeddedness, com-
munitarians derive an emphasis on “the value of communal 
existence” (Garner 2005, 89).
Characteristically, communitarianism has, in part, been 
associated with conservatism in their mutual convergence on 
existing social unity and anxiety about the diversification of 
society. This kind of “backward-looking communitarianism” 
(Kymlicka 2002, 276) would shy away from any talk of includ-
ing animals in the political society out of fear of undermining 
the necessary social accord. Thus, the modern resurgence of 
virtue ethics and neo-Aristotelian political philosophy has had 
a very limited influence on discussions of animal ethics and an-
imal rights. In Dependent Rational Animals (MacIntyre 1999), 
the father of modern neo-Aristotelian thought, Alasdair Ma-
cIntyre, suggests an ethically relevant commonality between 
humans and animals based, in large part, on shared conditions 
of vulnerability and dependence. A virtuous society should, 
according to MacIntyre, incorporate the marginal cases – the 
very young, the disabled, and, following his own logic, certain 
so-called higher animals – into the community, and hold their 
individual flourishing as “an important index of the flourish-
ing of the whole community” (ibid., 109). The most substantial 
incorporation of animals into a communitarian theory is, how-
ever, presented to us by Martha C. Nussbaum in Frontiers of 
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Justice (2006). Here she sets out a theory of justice which goes 
beyond the Rawlsian call for compassion: “Unlike contracta-
rianism this approach involves direct obligations of justice to 
animals; […] Unlike Utilitarianism, it respects each individual 
creature” (ibid., 351). Nussbaum maintains that we have rela-
tions of commonality with numerous members of non-human 
species, and that some of these – maybe even most of those we 
have relations with – are “capable of dignified existence” (ibid., 
326).  This dignity is rooted in the Marxian idea of the human 
being as a being “in need of a totality of human life-activities” 
(ibid., 74), and is intertwined with the citizens’ entitlement to 
a list of capabilities. This is a rather diverse and pluralistic list 
of capabilities, each of which can be read as an intrinsic ability 
and, simultaneously, as grounds for establishing a sphere of 
rights and opportunities which must be respected. Pertaining 
to animals, Nussbaum’s list is not limited to capabilities such 
as life and bodily health, but lists also affiliation and the con-
trol over one’s environment (ibid., 393-400). Nussbaum main-
tains that we share our world with animals worthy of dignity, 
and this, in itself, leads to obligations of justice towards others 
whose flourishing is part of the flourishing of the community. 
Such thinking is an antithesis to the duties of compassion pro-
claimed by Rawls. In Rawls’ approach to animal compassion, 
there need not be any wrong-doing involved. In saving a dog 
from being burnt, it makes, from the third point of view, no dif-
ference for Rawls whether the dog is being hurt by the fire from 
an erupting volcano or by an adult person with a fiery stick. 
Nussbaum, however, insists on a clear difference in the obliga-
tion of compassion. In the former example, we have a case of 
pure compassion obligating one to rescue the dog. In the latter, 
we are presented with a more complicated case including com-
passion and delivering a being from harm, with the additional 
matter of duty to “inhibit, and punish acts of the sort that cause 
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the suffering occasioning the compassion” (ibid., 336). This 
concerns preventing disrespect of the animal’s rights; it is a 
matter of justice. 
The rights involved, however, are not those attributed to Re-
gan’s subject-of-a-life beings. Where animal rights, in Regan’s 
eyes, almost entirely translate to the negative rights of being 
left alone by humans, Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian approach 
focuses on rights of a more positive kind, placing such rights 
in an active relational context. All animals with which we have 
relations are thus – and in their capacity as sentient beings with 
dignity – “direct subjects of the theory of justice” (ibid., 389). 
They are not part of the sort of reflective equilibrium or over-
lapping societal consensus about animal rights which Nuss-
baum sees as a possibility within future constitutional democ-
racies. In this sense, the capability approach concurs with the 
social contract approach, in that only humans can participate 
in the shaping of political consensus due to their higher fac-
ulties of reason. As we have seen, this does not by necessity 
exclude animals from the rights established by a political con-
sensus. Rather, Nussbaum incorporates animals in the over-
lapping consensus through the notion of guardianship where 
animals are “endowed with entitlements that are theirs, even if 
exercised through [prudent human] guardianship” (ibid., 376). 
This should be understood as a benevolent paternalism aimed 
at securing the species-specific flourishing of animals through 
surrogate imaginative sympathy and knowledge of their lives. 
It is important, however, to recognize that this does not amount 
to indirect Kantian duties in which the guardian, instead of the 
animal, becomes the real target of obligation. The guardian’s 
role is not that of surrogate rights-holder, but, as the term indi-
cates, a role of rights-protector, pro-active supporter, and proxy 
choice-maker. Such an argument is similarly seen in the work 
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of Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson who argue for a politi-
cal representation of animals that circumvent the problem of 
animals not being able to participate in voting (Kymlicka and 
Donaldson 2011, 153). They argue that public systems ought to 
be constructed that give an institutional framework to the work 
of such guardians. This could be done, for example, by creat-
ing animal ombudsmen or designated legal representation for 
animals (ibid., 154).
The Animal Welfare State: Rights
Before exploring how a certain kind of welfare state could 
possibly support the proliferation of animal rights, it is neces-
sary to return to the notion of animal rights themselves in or-
der to clarify how these would have to be incorporated into an 
animal welfare state.
A contractarian theory of rights, which insists on the ratio-
nality of the contract participants, will never be able to encom-
pass animals. This is what Kant and Carruthers recognized in 
and lead the latter to a contractarian moral theory, which states 
that “there is no basis for extending moral protection to ani-
mals” (Carruthers 1992, 196). Rawls, however, following the 
same theoretical path as Carruthers, seems to intuitively shy 
away from this logical step, circumventing it by creating two 
separate spheres of morals, one of duties regarding justice and 
one of duties of compassion. In addition to giving the impres-
sion of an evasive strategy, Rawls’ idea of two separate spheres 
of moral duties also leaves us with two levels of value, effective-
ly referring animals to an inferior status. Although this tactic 
retains animals (and human marginal cases) within the moral 
sphere, it is as second-rate citizens – vulnerable to the attitudes 
and behavior which follow such conceptual language. This is, 
in part, what Andrew Dobson indicates when writing “justice 
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implies a ground-level equality between distributor and recipi-
ent which charity does not; […] obligations born of justice are 
more binding and less revocable than those born of charity” 
(Dobson 1998, 95). Thus, I find that Rawls’ semi-inclusion of 
animals in a concept of compassionate duty represents not so 
much a salvaging as a demoting of moral standing for animals.
There are, as I see it, constructive and promising ways of 
salvaging a rights-based approach to animal ethics. Primarily 
it must be a theory of rights which does not automatically ex-
clude non-rational beings. A necessary condition of inclusion 
could be, for example, a matter of sentience or vulnerability. 
This would not only entail the inclusion of many species of 
animals, but would also resolve the intuitively problematic ex-
clusion of young children and cognitively disabled adults. Such 
a modification would, of course, lead to the contract becoming 
asymmetrical – i.e. between rational agents and non-rational 
beings. This asymmetry has two associated aspects. Firstly, 
it is an asymmetry of power where knowledge, including un-
derstanding the contract, is limited to one side. Secondly, ani-
mals are incapable of consenting to as well as abiding by the 
contract’s terms. It is these aspects of asymmetry which are 
the target of Nussbaum’s “prudent guardianship” (Nussbaum 
2006, 376) in which rational agents become representatives 
of animals, charged with protecting and advocating their en-
titlements/rights. Nussbaum sees this as an analogue case to 
the instances where disabilities have compromised a human’s 
“capacity for choice and autonomy” (ibid., 375). In such cases, 
as with animals in general, she proposes a carefully executed 
paternalism through which the animal becomes included in the 
social contract and the overlapping consensus.
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The Animal Welfare State: Rights, Inclusion, and 
Solidarity
From Nussbaum’s idea of the benevolent paternalistic guard-
ian, we can approach an animal rights theory with a more ac-
tively inclusive structure.  It is important that we understand 
rights as having both an intrinsic and extrinsic property. By 
intrinsic property it is implied that the capable bearer of rights 
is a being that, if her rights are respected, is better off. This 
would exclude all inanimate objects since it would be difficult 
to comprehend how, for example, a rock could be better or 
worse off. It would, however, according to this initial defini-
tion, not necessarily exclude plants and other beings without 
mind. Yet, the focus of this article is on animals such as pigs 
and dogs which are embedded in our culture and cannot only 
be better or worse off, but are, furthermore, capable of expe-
riencing their lives as better or worse. By extrinsic property it 
is implied that rights necessarily involve relations to rational 
agents capable of having obligations. By the concept of embed-
ded I mean to argue along the lines of Kymlicka and Donaldson 
that there are certain types of animals that have the capacity 
to enter into mixed-species community and some types that 
cannot (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2011, 123). Fundamentally, 
any animal must, in order to be able to become a citizen, be of 
such a type that it can be socialized into a human-animal com-
munity. This is not a continued subjugation of the animal “but a 
temporary developmental process for bringing individuals into 
full membership of the community” (ibid., 125). Such a social-
ization into and inclusion in mixed-species communities is not 
feasible for many wild animals and I agree with Kymlicka and 
Donaldson that as such these should be considered inhabitants 
of sovereign animal nations (ibid., 156). The relationship with 
these animals should thus be considered a matter of interna-
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tional justice and is not a matter of rights and solidarity within 
the mixed human-animal community.
The Nordic welfare state’s emphasis on the relational prop-
erties of rights is mirrored in its concept of solidarity. Solidari-
ty is commonly defined as having both a descriptive character-
istic of a certain common-ground structure in a social group, 
and as a normative characteristic concerning members of a so-
cial group having “mutual obligations to aid each other, as and 
when should be necessary” (Bayertz 1999, 3).
Concerning the former, the problem quickly becomes one 
of community cohesion. Solidarity, as well as Aristotelian 
communitarian based theories, relies on a given group’s par-
ticipants having some kind of common linkage by which each 
member can be ascertained as one of us. Whatever this linkage 
is anchored in, rationality, shared values, common fate or com-
mon history, it implies that a) there is a limit to the community 
and thus someone or something must be external to it, and b) 
the characteristics of those who are external to the commu-
nity provide, to a certain extent, a definition of the community 
members through their otherness. In relation to our present 
question about domesticated animals, this raises the question 
of inter-species descriptive solidarity – i.e. is it meaningful to 
understand animals as integrated into human social groups 
and, indeed, can people and animals understand themselves 
as belonging to the same social groups? In other words: does 
descriptive solidarity necessarily entail bonds that could not 
exist between man and animal? I do not believe this is the case. 
We simply have too much evidence of group-oriented human-
animal bonding to reject the entire notion of inter-species com-
munities. Companion animals such as dogs are commonly re-
ferred to and understood as parts of families and, conversely, 
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dogs understand themselves as part of the family (Wells 2009). 
There are no logical species boundaries in descriptive soli-
darity relating to humans’ understanding of the relationship. 
We are, as humans, obviously capable of “feelings of belong-
ing together or sympathy” (Wildt 1999, 217) towards animals 
of many different species. This, however, is most likely not a 
reciprocal understanding and besides a few examples – most 
noticeably dogs – it would be difficult to attribute a general 
cross-species feeling of belonging from animals in general to 
humans in general. Alternatively, it is, as already indicated, not 
a necessity for community membership (descriptive solidarity) 
that all participating members are rational beings. Nor is it a 
necessity to understand their connectedness to the whole that 
is society. The community and levels of solidarity are defined 
from the stand-point of those rational beings who understand 
the concept of communal connectedness. There is no logical 
reason why such a community should not include beings which 
do not understand their part in the community, nor partake 
knowingly in its structuring. 
We encounter comparable issues when addressing the nor-
mative characteristics of solidarity – and, to a certain extent, 
comparable answers. Understanding solidarity as a moral rela-
tion between individuals is, as its communitarian roots sug-
gest, a very old perception. Although Theophrastus (371-287 
BC) to a large extent continues the philosophy of his teacher 
Aristotle, he rejects Aristotle’s dismissal of animals as belong-
ing in the moral community and maintains “that animals enjoy 
kinship (oikeiotês) with us” (Sorabji 1993, 177). With this mor-
al notion of kinship, Theophrastus introduces a non-speciesist 
normative solidarity (as well as non-speciesist communitarian 
ethics). It is the matter of belonging which is stressed instead 
of rational (contract-) abilities, and it maintains that an asym-
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metrical solidarity could be extended to include the non-human 
parts of the community as rights beneficiaries – albeit not as 
obligation-havers. One could argue in support of the claim that 
animal rights and animals’ inclusion in the moral community 
is impossible due to the limits of moral psychology. Bernard E. 
Rollin states that we have a deep-seated “(perhaps biologically 
based) intuition that we favour those made close to us by bonds 
of blood, friendship or love” (Rollin 2005, 110), and this is the 
foundation of what he calls the “reasonable partiality” of moral 
psychology. We are limited by our psychological make-up to 
such a degree that it renders us incapable of being universally 
impartial. Rollin does, however, claim that partiality, based on 
Aristotle’s concept of philia (brotherly love), has already been 
extended to many companion animals (ibid., 120), and that 
there is no reason why, with time, such extensions of moral 
psychology could not encompass other animals. 
It is along analogous lines that I see the political norma-
tive concept of solidarity working in favor of animal rights 
and animal welfare. Incorporating Benton’s socialist concept 
of need and Nussbaum’s inclusive communitarianism, we can 
identify and incorporate animals as community members who, 
although they are incapable of obligations, have the needs and 
entitlements ensured by the concept of belonging. Solidarity, 
when extended to animals in our society, is an extension of 
rights – rights of inclusion and rights to communal care. There 
is no inherent problem in solidarity-influenced states uphold-
ing the direct individual (negative) rights. However, in addi-
tion to the individuals’ rights directed at the individuals’ duties 
(and vice versa), solidarity presses the necessity of individu-
als’ rights and duties being directed at the community or state. 
In other words, among the duties that we have, according to 
solidarity, are duties towards the community as a whole. Mark 
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Sagoff implicitly touches upon this when he states that our de-
liberations as citizens should “take as their logical subject the 
community as a whole” (Sagoff 2008, 38). Duties towards our 
common society as a whole – which we could call citizen du-
ties – lack the directness of normal rights-theory duties. They 
are not specific and have very little to say about individual 
people’s rights and what these rights demand of other people. 
Citizen duties are concerned with and aim towards the good 
of the community as a whole; there is no immediate and cor-
responding right to a citizen duty. Citizen rights, on the other 
hand, are rights possessed by all members of the community. 
They are positive rights of belonging and, through this belong-
ing, rights to be treated as members of the community and be 
cared for. Citizen rights are not connected as directly to citizen 
duties, but are directed towards the representation of citizens 
– i.e. the state or government. This means that the state is not 
just the night watchman whose function it is to ensure that the 
members of society respect the rights of each other. The soli-
darity-state itself is infused with collective duties of members 
and thus becomes the object towards which citizen rights must 
turn. Instead of understanding society as merely a gathering of 
individual rational agents who come to terms with each other 
through reflection on justice, the concept of solidarity institu-
tionalizes benevolence aimed at all citizens independent of their 
rationality or capability for reciprocation. Culturally integrated 
animals, such as farm or working animals, have needs both as 
a consequence of being living conscious beings and, further-
more, because of their confined and controlled lives. When we 
extend the notion of the moral community and solidarity to 
these animals, the realization or frustration of their needs is no 
longer merely related to the personal compassion (or duties of 
compassion) of farmers, but becomes a community issue and a 
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matter of the community, via a pro-active state, living up to its 
duty to its members.
In the 17th and 18th Centuries large sections of land around 
Europe and North America were defined as common land and 
used mainly for the grazing of livestock. The commons, as they 
came to be called, were pieces of land where all the local farm-
ers had the right to graze their sheep or cattle, and the duty to 
keep the land usable and avoid over-grazing. These rights and 
duties of the commoners were not rights and duties towards 
other individual commoners, but towards the common itself. 
Not the common as the land as such, but the common as the 
community one belongs to and its common use and common 
resources, now and in the future. In this sense, rights and du-
ties are an aspect of what we could label common justice and 
indicate the justice of solidarity. Common justice and the rights 
which derive from it should not be understood as a replacement 
for liberal rights. Liberal rights theories like those of Regan 
and Rawls are necessities of individuals’ interaction with other 
individuals in just ways. They must, however, encompass more 
in the sphere of justice than a few rational humans. A theory 
of justice must, as Regan’s indeed does, reach beyond the nar-
row limits of species and rationality. Such extension of rights 
to include animals must, furthermore, realize the voicelessness 
of these beings and consequently provide them with sympa-
thetic human advocates. These Nussbaumian guardians are, 
to a certain extent, a practical solution to a problem arising 
from theory. Liberal rights, although theoretically universal, 
are functionally beneficial mainly to those who can stand up 
for themselves. This is an easily amendable problem when the 
question of rights and duties occurs between adult and rational 
human beings. But when rights and duties occurring between 
humans and animals are questioned, the asymmetry develops 
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to problematic proportions. Thus, a neutral state must, by ap-
pointing human advocates, function as the voices of animals. 
This point leads to the last necessary feature of any liberal ani-
mal rights theory: it must be accompanied by a non-individual 
rights approach, such as common justice, reflecting the con-
nectedness of communities – and making the rights of the com-
munity members a public matter and the duties towards them 
a state requirement. Thus, liberal justice and common justice 
are not mutually exclusive. Common justice – or solidarity – 
merely illustrates that liberal rights are not all there is to say on 
the subject of animal rights.
To Conclude – on the Animal-Human Commu-
nity
The Nordic welfare state, and its emphasis on solidarity 
and equality of results, provides a better foundation for ani-
mal rights than more liberal political philosophies. But why 
even focus on farm and working animals and the possibilities 
of rights? Would any substantial rights for these animals not 
immediately lead to the abolition of animal agriculture?
There are two reasons why the rights theory proposed in this 
article will not necessarily lead to the abandonment of animal 
agriculture and working animals. The first is connected to the 
theory of common justice and solidarity, the foundations of the 
Nordic welfare state. Solidarity rests upon reciprocal obliga-
tion enacted through the state, and in this view animals can 
be obliged – as any other citizen with the ability to do so – to 
contribute to society in general and the welfare of the com-
munity. The concept of common justice animal rights does not 
necessarily, like that of Regan’s liberal negative rights, aim at 
preventing the use of animals. The solidarity concept, and that 
of common justice (citizen rights and citizen duties) does not 
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rule out the use of animals for humans’ (or for other animals’) 
sake. Indeed, one could quite possibly defend working animals, 
companion animals and certain forms of animal agriculture as 
paternalistically helping animals to fulfill their obligations to 
the society of which they are part. This could be the “gentle 
usage to these creatures” identified by Hume (2006, 25). The 
citizen duties are, in principle, not exclusive to humans – so, 
although the killing of young animals constitute a problem, 
farm animal uses such as egg and milk production could, in 
downscaled and radically altered versions, be justified under 
a paternalistic common justice. The exclusion of animals as 
contributors to our common human-animal society could, in 
effect, be considered a denial of true citizenship (Kymlicka and 
Donaldson 2011, 137).  
The second reason is of a more practical nature. How we 
perceive and understand animals correlates directly to our pos-
itive or negative attitudes and behavior towards them (Harfeld 
2010). Attitudes and their corresponding behavior are not fixed 
entities and can change, reflecting new beliefs and opinions 
(Knight et al. 2010). Such changes, seen not individually but 
on a societal level, are the development of what Rollin calls 
“Ethics₁” – i.e. “the set of beliefs that society, individuals, or 
subgroups of society hold about good and bad, right and wrong, 
justice and injustice, fairness and unfairness” (Rollin 2006, 
31). Changing these beliefs is the key to changing the lives of 
animals and increasing animal welfare among animals in our 
society. Thus, an animal rights approach is not only about argu-
ing the reasonableness of rights and possibly effectuating these 
through laws. It is about creating changes in culture through 
changes in the public’s standing on a certain issue. I perceive 
the philosophical and public debate on animal rights, as well as 
the effectuated animal rights and welfare legislation, as always 
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being subject to cultural morphology. Changing the moral psy-
chology of society in this manner is perhaps the single most 
important factor in creating an animal welfare state.
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